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Researchers have shown great interest over the years in the institutional foundations by which nations gain 
comparative economic advantage.  The varieties of capitalism literature is the most recent contribution (Hall 
and Soskice 2001a, 2001b).  It compares the institutional arrangements of national political economies to 
determine how institutional differences affect economic performance and social well-being.  In contrast to an 
earlier wave of research in comparative political economy that examined how strong and weak states, 
corporatism, and pluralism affected macroeconomic performance and national economic competitiveness 
(e.g., Katzenstein 1979, 1985), the varieties of capitalism literature focuses on the firm and how firms are 
embedded in their institutional environments in ways that influence competitiveness.  In sum, while the 
earlier work in comparative political economy was concerned with institutional variation in policy-making 
regimes (how states coordinate the economy), the varieties of capitalism literature is concerned with 
institutional variation in production regimes (how firms coordinate production). 
 
 Absent from these two literatures is much discussion about knowledge regimes.  By 
knowledge regime we mean how organizations and institutions coordinate the creation and dissemination of 
policy ideas that affect how production regimes and the economy are organized and operate in the first 
place. Knowledge regimes are important because they contribute data, research, theories, policy 
recommendations, and other ideas that influence public policy and, in turn, national economic 
competitiveness.  And they are an important source of change in capitalist economies (e.g., Blyth 2002; 
Campbell 1998).  For example, the rise of neoliberal ideas during the 1970s and 1980s contributed to the 
institutional transformation of many capitalist economies by suggesting that deregulation, privatization, trade 
liberalization, and cuts in taxes and government spending would stimulate growth without inflation (Babb 
2001; Campbell and Pedersen 2001).  As is true for policy-making and production regimes, it appears that 
the organization, functioning, and impact of knowledge regimes vary across countries (Fourcade-Gourinchas 
and Babb 2002). 
 This paper develops the concept of knowledge regime and shows how knowledge regimes 
vary across the two most basic varieties of capitalism: liberal and coordinated market economies.  The key 
questions motivating this paper are whether there are different types of knowledge regimes associated with 
different varieties of capitalism during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries; how they generate 
policy ideas; and how they disseminate these ideas to policy makers.  Hence, this paper begins to fill an 
important blind spot in the comparative political economy and varieties of capitalism literatures. 
 It is surprising that such a blind spot exists because since the early 1990s a rich literature has 
emerged on how ideas affect policymaking (Campbell 2002).  On the one hand, some of the scholarship on 
ideas has examined how different types of ideas vary across countries and, therefore, produce different 
policy-making outcomes (e.g., Blyth 2002; Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1996; Ziegler 1997).  On the other 
hand, some proponents of the varieties of capitalism approach have been major contributors to the literature 
on ideas (e.g., Hall 1989, 1993, 1992; Locke and Thelen 1995).  It is ironic, then, that they have not more 
deliberately connected their work on ideas with their work on national competitiveness. 
  This paper proceeds as follows... 
 
RESEARCH ON IDEAS AND KNOWLEDGE REGIMES 
 Two literatures point to the importance of knowledge regimes.  First is the literature on how 
“ideas” affect the policy making process (Campbell 2002).  This work focuses on how policy programs 
provide focal points and weapons in policy debate (Blyth 1997; 2002; Goldstein 1993; Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993); how the intellectual paradigms that underlie policy programs, such as neoclassical 
economics, affect the taken-for-granted assumptions of policy makers and thus constrain policy options (Hall 
1993, 1992, 1989; Jacobsen 1995; McNamara 1998); how public sentiments, norms, values, and identities 
limit the range of policy options available to policy makers (Katzenstein 1996; Locke and Thelen 1995; Weir 
1992); and how actors frame their policy proposals in ways that resonate with the paradigms that guide 
policy makers and the public sentiments that concern citizens (Gamson 1992; Reich 1988; Schmidt 2001).  
However, much of this literature focuses on how the structure of different types of ideas constrains policy 
making.  Missing is much discussion of the actors, organizations, and institutions that affect the creation, 
framing, and transmission of these ideas.  That is, the literature privileges structure over agency and, thus, 
does not clearly specify some of the most important mechanisms whereby knowledge affects states and 
economies (Campbell 2004, chap. 4; Yee 1996).  Furthermore, although some of the scholarship on ideas 
examines how different types of policy ideas vary across countries and, therefore, produce different policy 
outcomes in different places (e.g., Berman 1998; Blyth 2002; Ziegler 1997), few researchers have examined 
how the operation and impact of the knowledge regimes that produce these ideas in the first place may also 
vary cross-nationally. 
 A second much smaller literature does a better job of investigating how knowledge regimes 
are organized, how they create policy ideas, what the mechanisms are by which these ideas are 
disseminated to policy makers, and, importantly, how all of this varies among countries.  Four studies stand 
out. 
 The first and most systematic is that done by Peter Hall and his colleagues who examined the 
diffusion of Keynesian policy ideas across several advanced capitalist countries to determine how 
Keynesianism influenced macroeconomic policy during the mid-twentieth century (Hall 1989).  However, the 
primary focus of their work was on the diffusion of policy relevant knowledge, and on the economic, political, 
and administrative conditions that facilitated or inhibited the adoption of these ideas by policy makers in 
different countries.  They were much less interested in the initial creation of policy ideas per se. 
 
 Mary Furner and Barry Supple (1990) organized another group of researchers to study how 
the U.S. and British states contributed to the development of economic knowledge during the first half of the 
twentieth century and how policy makers in these countries used this knowledge to guide economic policy.  
The principle concern was to investigate the relationship between the development and use of economic 
knowledge and the rise of the modern state during an unprecedented period of state building in both 
countries.  However, this research compared two countries that most comparative political economists argue 
are quite similar insofar as both are liberal or uncoordinated market economies as opposed to the more 
corporatist or statist economies of continental Europe (e.g., Kitschelt et al. 1999).  Hence, this project did not 
represent the full range of the varieties of capitalism. 
 A third study, organized by Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (1996), examined the 
origins and dissemination of a variety of policy ideas regarding social policy and welfare state formation 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Their selection of cases was much less systematic 
than that of either the Hall or Furner and Supple studies insofar as different contributors focused on different 
time periods, different countries, and different aspects of social policy.  For instance, one chapter focused on 
Scandinavian social security ideas during the 1890s.  Another discussed unemployment policies in Britain 
and the United States at the turn of the twentieth century.  And yet another examined welfare policy in the 
United States and Canada during the early twentieth century. 
 Finally, Mark Blyth’s (2002) analysis of the Keynesian and neoliberal revolutions in Sweden 
and the United States is the most systematic analysis of knowledge regimes.  It shows how normative and 
scientific ideas emanating from the economics profession and elsewhere influenced policy making and 
institutional change in both countries during the mid- and late-twentieth centuries.  Sweden and the United 
States represent, respectively, coordinated and liberal market economies as discussed in the varieties of 
capitalism literature.  And the effects of neoliberalism is a story that is more current in terms of the 
development of capitalism.  Yet Blyth’s attention is primarily on how these ideas were used politically to 
shape policy making.  He paid relatively little attention to how knowledge regimes produced these ideas in 
the first place.  Nonetheless, his work is closest to what we have in mind here. 
 In sum, all four of these projects produced important insights about how knowledge regimes 
are organized and operate, but were limited in one way or another.  Some focused on an earlier era during 
which states, economies, and presumably knowledge regimes were organized differently.  Think tanks, for 
example, have become increasingly important sources of policy ideas since the 1970s (Stone 1996).  Some 
paid relatively little attention to how policy ideas were produced rather than disseminated or used as 
weapons in policy-making conflicts.  And some utilized cross-national comparisons that were either arbitrary 
or that focused on only one type of capitalism. 
 Over all, both of these literatures point toward, but in most cases do not systematically 
develop, an analysis of knowledge regimes.  Nonetheless, we will draw on this work where appropriate as 
well as other literatures to develop our arguments.  But first we need to be clear about what a knowledge 
regime is. 
 
WHAT IS A KNOWLEDGE REGIME? 
 Knowledge regimes are sets of organizations and institutions that produce and disseminate 
policy ideas that affect how production regimes and the economy are organized and operate.1  Knowledge 
                                                 
1Although of less concern in this paper, knowledge regimes may also occasionally contribute ideas that affect policy-
making regimes.  The rise of neoliberalism, for instance, included calls for more streamlined and efficiency-oriented 
policymaking and public administration, the use of cost-benefit analysis, and the like. 
regimes should not be confused with policy-making regimes.  Whereas policy-making regimes formulate and 
implement policies that affect national economic competitiveness, knowledge regimes produce the 
intellectual foundations, analytic paradigms, and programmatic ideas that policy makers often use to 
formulate policy in the policy-making process.  They provide policy ideas, inspiration, and advice to policy 
makers.  As a result, the work of knowledge regimes tends to occur before the work of policy-making 
regimes.  A knowledge regime can be characterized in terms of the content of the knowledge it produces, 
how knowledge production is organized, and how it functions.  There is considerable variation in the 
arrangement of knowledge regimes across countries. 
 
Content 
 Policy ideas can affect three spheres of activity that influence national economic 
competitiveness.  First are policy ideas that affect macroeconomic management.  We are thinking particularly 
about knowledge that informs macroeconomic, monetary, regulatory, labor market, and industrial 
policymaking.  This includes refined economic theories and prescriptions that are used for adjusting and fine 
tuning policies already in place as well as big paradigmatic ideas that can result in fundamental shifts in 
policy approaches, such as the shift from Keynesian to neoliberal policy models. 
 Second, are policy ideas that affect the ability of firms to manage a variety of more local 
coordination problems that must be resolved in order for firms to achieve competitiveness.  According to the 
varieties of capitalism literature, firms must bargain over wages and working conditions; secure a workforce 
with suitable skills; obtain financing and balance the interests of shareholders and stakeholders; manage 
their relationships with suppliers, customers, and other firms; and ensure that their employees work well with 
each other and with management (Hall and Soskice 2001b, pp. 6-7).  As table 1 suggests, the manner in 
which firms handle these five coordination problems depends in part on a variety of public policies.  In turn, 
knowledge regimes generate ideas that policymakers use in formulating these policies.  For example, during 
the late 1970s conservative academics, think tanks, and pundits argued that U.S. labor productivity was 
declining because generous welfare programs reduced the fear of unemployment and thus contributed to 
worker laziness.  Furthermore, they believed that strong unions undermined the ability of firms to hire and 
fire, keep wages and benefits under control, and do other things that might improve their competitiveness.  
Ideas like these eventually contributed to shifts in both welfare and labor policy (e.g., Edsall 1984; Goldfield 
1987; Palmer and Sawhill 1984). 
 
Table 1 about here 
 Third, policy ideas affect the availability of technology and science that firms use to achieve 
competitiveness.  This, of course, is especially important in today’s globalizing economy where 
competitiveness depends increasingly on technical and scientific knowledge (Thurow 2000).  For instance, 
after the Second World War, French leaders believed that the state should coordinate technology-promotion 
policies and that scientific elites should guide these efforts.  Hence, French science policy focused on major 
technological or scientific breakthroughs and, in turn, firms tended to compete on the basis of altogether new 
products and services.  In post-war Germany, however, leaders held that the public and private sectors 
should cooperate more fully in these endeavors and that scientific elites should not dominate matters.  As a 
result, policy was geared more toward incremental technological innovation and the adaptation of already 
existing technologies developed elsewhere.  Thus, German firms came to compete on the basis of 
continuously improving products and production processes rather than developing fundamentally new 
products (Ziegler 1997). 
 
Organizational Structure 
 Policy relevant knowledge is produced within organizations.  Our primary concern is with how 
this is done within countries.  These organizations include, for instance, universities, public or private 
research institutes (sometimes known as think tanks), and research units attached to political parties, 
government ministries, labor unions, or business associations.  Furthermore, these organizations may either 
cooperate or compete with each other, be organized in centralized or decentralized fashion, and be funded 
by and receive their mandates from either public or private sources. 
 
 For example, as is well known, knowledge production in French universities is organized in a 
very hierarchical fashion with a small group of elite universities.  The state long sought to preserve a 
monopoly on higher education and created the elite system of grandes écoles toward that end.  Each one 
specializes in a certain type of knowledge production (e.g., engineering, mathematics and science, public 
administration, etc.)  Hence, knowledge production in France is highly centralized, financed and coordinated 
by the central state, and closely linked to the state elites, many of whom graduated from these schools 
(Ziegler 1997, pp. 28-31).  In contrast, the United States has a much more decentralized university system 
where the top schools may be funded either publicly or privately, are much less specialized in terms of a 
planned division of intellectual labor, and are much less tightly connected to the nation-state.  Indeed, with 
the exception of federal grants and contracts, which flow to both public and private universities, all the public 
universities are financed primarily by state-level, not national-level, government (Rubery and Grimshaw 
2003, chap. 5). 
 
 Think tanks are another source of policy ideas that has grown in importance.  In some 
countries, such as the United States, there are dozens, if not hundreds, of these funded by various private 
foundations or other organizations, and competing with each other to generate knowledge and disseminate it 
to policy makers.  Elsewhere, think tanks are fewer in number, sometimes funded by public sources or 
political parties, and operating in a much less competitive environment. 
 
 Of course, these organizations operate increasingly in a world populated by transnational 
organizations that may also develop and disseminate knowledge that policy makers use.  Here we are 
thinking about nonprofit organizations, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and OECD, 
that collect and analyze data, formulate policy recommendations, and then distribute these to member 
nations.  The OECD, for example, contributed to the generation of policy ideas advocating sound monetary 
and fiscal policies, which eventually were adopted by many advanced capitalist countries during the 1980s 
and 1990s (Marcussen 2004). 
 
 Additionally, there are so-called transnational epistemic communities, which consist of 
academics or other professionals who promulgate theories and other ideas that inform domestic 
policymaking (Haas 1992; Haas and Haas 1995).  A good example is the emergence of a network of central 
bankers from different countries who have contributed to the formulation and dissemination of ideas favoring 
neoliberal monetary policy (Marcussen 2000).  They have also developed new ideas about regulating 
international banking as transnational capital flows have increased since the 1970s (Kapstein 1994). 
 
Functioning and Process 
 The manner in which knowledge is produced and disseminated to policy makers is also 
variable.  To begin with, knowledge producing organizations may be partisan or non-partisan.  In the United 
States, for example, research institutes may be guided by either relatively objective scientific canons or 
deliberately push partisan agendas.  Some, like the Rand Corporation, that often work under government 
contract, or others, such as the Brookings Institution, Russell Sage Foundation, American Enterprise 
Institute, and Hoover Institution, at least during their earlier days, have been dedicated to bringing scientific 
knowledge to bear on public policy issues.  They employ researchers of university type and caliber whose 
work contributes typically to ongoing scientific debates and is published in professional journals and books.  
Other organizations, such as the Cato Institute, Heritage Foundation, and the Institute for Policy Studies are 
more like political advocacy organizations with ideologically derived policy agendas.  These spend less 
attention on scientific inquiry and advancing scholarly research per se and more on packaging research 
produced elsewhere for consumption by policymakers.  The latter have much less interest in erecting 
barriers between policy research and political advocacy work (Abelson and Carberry 1998; Gelner 1995; 
Ricci 1993; Smith 1991).  In other words, some organizations function primarily as scientific research shops 
while others are more interested in influencing the ideological tone of public policy per se. 
 
 Knowledge producing organizations may influence policymaking either directly or indirectly.  
On the one hand, organizations can disseminate knowledge directly to policymakers through position papers 
and reports written explicitly for them, through testimony provided by organizational representatives to 
government ministries, committees, and commissions, and by moving personnel from these organizations 
into government positions.  They may also participate in various policy discussion groups or other less formal 
professional or social venues where politicians, academics, and others gather to discuss policy issues (e.g., 
Domhoff 2006, chap 4).  On the other hand, they may also pursue more indirect channels of influence.  One 
is by publishing their research in professional journals and similar outlets.  Another is by pursuing the media 
in efforts to get their work published or cited on the op-ed or editorial pages of newspapers, on television and 
radio, and so on (Abelson 1992; Rich and Weaver 2000). 
 
 But what determines how knowledge regimes are organized and operate?  We submit that 
this is heavily influenced by the institutional environments within which they exist.  That is, this is influenced 
by the policy-making and production regimes with which a knowledge regime is associated.  What follows is 
a series of propositions that specify the nature of the relationship, on the one hand, between knowledge 
regimes and policy-making regimes and, on the other hand, between knowledge regimes and production 
regimes. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE REGIMES AND POLICY-MAKING REGIMES 
 
 All of this is likely contingent on the institutional surroundings within which knowledge 
production occurs.  Systematic research has not yet been done on a large number of countries, but we can 
glean from some of the literatures reviewed above a series of propositions about the relationship between 
knowledge regimes and policy-making regimes. 
 For instance, where ministries do not have their own in-house research capacity and where 
political parties are weak and do not have resident policy expertise, independent, private research institutes 
may be prevalent, and those that exist may be less ideologically motivated.  Where the division of powers 
between executive and legislative branches is great, as is true of the United States, independent research 
institutes may have more points of access to policymakers and, therefore, proliferate.  Where political parties 
are weak and divided, and have few resources with which to finance internal policy research, there is likely to 
be more demand for independent knowledge production and, in turn, more independent research institutes.  
And where a strong, professionalized, career-based civil service is absent policymakers may be more likely 
to turn to external sources of knowledge (Abelson and Carberry 1998; Gaffney 1991; James 1993; Stone 
1996, chap. 3).  Finally, where coalition governments are common, rather than governments run by a single 
party, think tanks and expert advisory organizations may be established by the government and operate in 
relatively non-partisan, ideologically neutral fashion (Mentzel 1999). 
 This suggests that there may be systematic differences in knowldge regimes associated with 
two basic types of policy-making regimes.  Anglo-Saxon type policy-making regimes tend to have 
decentralized and fragamented state structures, winner-take-all electoral systems that tend to reduce the 
number of viable political parties around, and pluralist or otherwise fragmented systems of interest group 
representation.  It follows, then, that this type of policy-making regime will have  
 
NOTE: Need to flesh out the above paragraph in a series of causal propositions for the two basic types of 
policy-making regimes. 
 
1. Anglo-Saxon type 
 decentralized state structure 
 winner-take-all electoral system 
pluralist/fragmented interest representation (no peak associations) 
2. Continental European type 
 centralized state structure 
 proportional representation electoral system 
 corporatist/unified interest representation (peak associations) 
These are ideal types.  There are exceptions on some dimensions.  Germany is decentralized/federalist.  
Britain is centralized so that the winner controls both executive and legislative branches usually.  France has 
less corporatism than many other European countries, but is very centralized. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE REGIMES AND PRODUCTION REGIMES 
 Although the literature on knowledge regimes is thin, there is even less on the relationship 
between knowledge regimes and production regimes, let alone comparisons across different varieties of 
capitalism.  We now offer a preliminary sketch of these relationships for the two most basic varieties of 
capitalism.  The argument is summarized in Table 2 
 
Table 2 about here 
NOTE: This section also should develop a series of propositions as did the last section for the two basic 
types of production regimes 
 
1. LME 
 no corporatist peak associations (hence many research institutes) 
 market solves everything/small welfare state. Hence, many philanthropic foundations and 
many research institutes. 
 
2. CME 
 corporatist peak associations (hence a few research institutes, one for business, one for 
labor) 
state solves everything/big welfare state.  Hence, few philanthropic foundations and few research 
institutes. 
 
LME and CME Production Regimes 
 
 As is well known, the varieties of capitalism literature distinguishes between two basic types of 
capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001b; Soskice 1999).  Liberal market economies (LME), such as the United 
States and Britain, structure economic activity primarily through markets and corporate hierarchies where 
corporate managers respond primarily to price signals and make strategic decisions without much 
consultation with other organizations in their environment. Coordinated market economies (CME) structure 
economic activity more through non-market relationships, such as informal networks, formal corporatist 
bargaining, and other governance mechanisms, whereby corporate managers consult regularly with other 
organizational actors and tend to coordinate their decision making with them.  Hence, the process of 
economic decision-making in LMEs is driven by market-based competition whereas in CMEs it is also driven 
by institutionally-based cooperation. 
 
  As a result, the content of economic decision making in LMEs reflects a shareholder model of 
capitalism where the interests of corporate shareholders are put first and firms compete to serve these 
interests.  In contrast, the content of economic decision making in CMEs reflects a stakeholder model of 
capitalism where the interests of corporate stakeholders are treated more equally.  A stakeholders is anyone 
with a vested interest in the corporation, including employees, customers, suppliers, and others as well as 
shareholders. 
 
 For instance, Japanese corporations often make decisions in classic CME fashion by 
consulting with a wide variety of stakeholders whereas corporations in the United States and Britain do not.  
A case in point is how layoffs are handled in these countries.  In Japan, managers consult with the company 
union before laying off workers and often negotiate with trading partners or subsidiaries to find new jobs for 
their redundant workers.  As such, Japanese employers try to abide by their commitment to a life time 
employment model and treat their workers, as well as their suppliers, subsidiaries, and customers, as part of 
a community which tries to put the common good above the interests of any individual member.  In line with 
the LME model, U.S. and British managers put the good of the firm above that of other stakeholders and 
simply terminate redundant workers, perhaps offering a severance package and a promise to rehire if the 
economic climate changes (Dore 2000; Jacoby 2005). 
 
 In sum, in CMEs economic decision making is coordinated through a variety of formal and 
informal means to serve the common good whereas in LMEs economic decision making is left more or less 
to individual actors, notably firms, who pursue the individual good.  Different institutional arrangements lead 
to different yet relatively stable systems of industrial relations, labor markets, vocational training, technology 
innovation, investment, inter-firm relations, and customer relations.  In turn, LMEs and CMEs gain 
competitive advantages in different ways. 
 
 Critics have argued that the distinction between LME and CME ignores important differences 
within each type of capitalism and ignores commonalities between apparently different types of capitalism 
(Campbell and Hall 2006; Kenworthy 2006).  For our purposes, however, the distinction is useful insofar as it 
enables us to begin to differentiate between two broad types of knowledge regimes that correspond with the 
LME and CME production regimes just described. 
 
LME and CME Knowledge Regimes 
 
 The organizational structure of knowledge regimes in LMEs involves a variety of universities, 
research institutes, and policy planning groups that operate in a decentralized, relatively uncoordinated 
fashion.  These are not typically affiliated in a formal sense with any political party or government ministry.  
This results in a knowledge creation process that can best be described as a market for ideas in which all of 
the knowledge producing units compete independently for the attention of public opinion makers, policy 
makers, or others who can influence the policymaking process.  This process involves what amounts to 
ideational lobbying, that is, a process whereby intellectuals and other ideational entrepreneurs seek to 
influence the policymaking process either directly or indirectly.  Such ideational lobbying is not necessarily 
ideological in the sense that it has a politically partisan axe to grind, although that may be true in some 
cases.  The process also occasionally involves the movement of intellectuals and others from knowledge 
producing organizations into official policy advisory roles, if not into policymaking positions per se, and vice 
versa. 
 
 This process is particularly well documented for the United States where the knowledge 
production regime consists of several organizational parts linked together in a network of ideas, personnel, 
and, ultimately, ideational influence.2  To begin with, elite public and private universities conduct policy 
relevant research that results in papers, books, and occasionally research reports that may find their way 
into the hands of policy makers and their advisors.  Insofar as this work is sponsored research, the research 
agendas of the sponsors (government, corporate, or non-profit foundation) tend to shape the substantive 
nature of knowledge production.  That is, research proposals that do not fit the policy interests of funding 
sources are not likely to receive financial support, although researchers may try to convince funders that new 
lines of inquiry are worth pursuing. 
 
 Universities also provide experts to a number of research institutes or think tanks that provide 
places for experts in various academic fields to work on policy issues without the normal teaching and 
administrative distractions associated with university duties.  These are non-profit organizations who receive 
their financial support from philanthropic foundations, corporate donations, and government grants and 
contracts and, therefore, are constrained in the directions that their research may take.  As noted earlier, 
research institutes contribute policy reports and other recommendations either to government or to what are 
often called policy discussion groups.  Some institutes are specialized in one or two topics while others have 
much broader scope.  And sometimes their efforts are augmented by institutes or research centers located 
at universities. 
 
 There is much competition among research institutes to influence the policy process.  Among 
the most important competitors is the Brookings Institution, which remains the dominant domestic policy 
research institute, and one that is known for its politically moderate positions.  The more conservative 
American Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation are two others.  However, there are dozens of these 
organizations vying for influence in the United States.  And their influence rises and falls depending on which 
way the political winds blow in Washington.  For instance, during the Reagan administration’s two terms in 
                                                 
2The discussion of the U.S. case that follows draws heavily from Domhoff 
(2006, chap. 4) and Dye (1995, chap. 9). 
office in the 1980s, the Brookings Institution’s influence was overshadowed by more conservative 
organizations.  It returned to prominence under the Clinton administration, especially insofar as Brookings 
personnel worked with the Clinton administration on tax reform, health care reform, and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement.  In any case, these sorts of organizations have been described as providing the 
deepest and most important source of ideas for the American policy-making process (Domhoff 2006, p. 87). 
 
 Policy planning and discussion groups are a third organizational element in the U.S. 
knowledge regime.  These tend to be nonpartisan organizations that assemble elite representatives from 
corporate and financial institutions, universities, the foundations, and the mass media as well as top 
intellectuals and influential people in government in order to discuss a wide range of policy issues.  These 
discussion groups, which vary in size and policy focus, are informal and usually off-the-record venues that 
facilitate a free exchange of ideas and debate.  They review the relevant research generated by universities 
and research institutes.  Discussion groups are organized by policy planning organizations, often with 
corporate backing.  Examples include the Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission, which 
focus on foreign political and economic affairs, as well as the Committee for Economic Development and the 
Business Roundtable.  Most important, while these organizations seek to generate consensus about what 
steps should be taken with respect to current policy topics, the reality is that much disagreement remains 
over specific policy recommendations.  Still, they do manage to tilt the agenda in a relatively conservative 
direction and marginalize the few experts with more politically liberal points of view (Domhoff 2006, p. 106). 
 
 Although garnering less attention from scholars who have studied the origins and influence of 
ideas in the U.S. policy-making process, there are also a variety of government-based research 
organizations, such as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the General Accounting Office (GAO), the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Congressional Research Service (CRS).  Many House 
and Senate committees also have research staffs and most cabinet-level departments have assistant 
secretaries directing professional research and evaluation units.  The capacity for research that these 
organizations have is sometimes considerably greater than most private research institutes and has grown 
over the years, in part at the urging of some private research institutes, such as the Russell Sage Foundation 
and the National Bureau of Economic Research.  The CBO, for example, has a staff of about 200 people and 
the CRS has a staff of about 900 people.  Given the constitutionally mandated separation of powers in the 
United States, and the fragmented nature of the legislative and executive branches, it is not surprising that 
there are so many research units inside government.  However, the fragmented nature of U.S. government 
also facilitates much competition between branches and agencies that has created opportunities for private 
research institutes to supply data, analysis, technical advice, and political argument to various players in 
these political contests.  Still, the proliferation of these in-government research capacities has diminished the 
relative influence of private research institutes in the policy-making process (Smith 1989). 
 
 Over all, then, the structure and process associated with knowledge and production regimes 
in LMEs are quite similar.  Both are decentralized and uncoordinated.  Furthermore, the knowledge regime 
resembles a market insofar as there is much competition among the organizations who generate policy ideas 
and then try to “sell” them through ideational lobbying to policy makers.  The competitive nature of this 
process is reflected perhaps in scholarly disagreements over which research institutes are most influential. 
As noted above, some believe that private research institutes and other knowledge producing organizations 
have become less influential as the in-government capacities for knowledge production have developed.  
Others, however, suggest that the network of private organizations is more important.  They also argue that 
because much of the financing for these private organizations comes from foundations, often established by 
wealthy families, or corporations, the interests of labor or other stakeholders are rarely reflected in the 
research agendas in question and that the narrow interests of corporate and shareholder America dominate 
the knowledge production process.  Hence, neoliberalism emerged early and found fertile ground in the 
United States, and minimizing unemployment gave way to controlling inflation as the chief objective of public 
policy during the 1980s and 1990s.  Things are much different in CMEs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
